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Questioning Our Principles: Anthropological 
Contributions to Ethical Dilemmas 
in Clinical Practice 
CAROLYN SARGENT and CAROLYN SMITH-MORRIS 
This paper presents an analysis of the applicability of a principalist approach 
for a global, or cross-cultural, bioethics. We focus especially on the principle of 
individual autonomy, a core value in ethical discourse. We echo some long­
standing criticisms of other anthropologists, sociologists, and many medical 
ethicists that the individualistic approach to autonomy is a Euro-American 
value and cannot be ethically applied in all settings. As a remedy, we suggest 
an adaptation of Kleinman's Explanatory Model approach to questions of 
decisionmaking.1 We argue that the analysis and resolution of ethical dilemmas 
might also benefit from forms of pedagogy that integrate anthropological and 
other social science perspectives, and the incorporation of ethnographic tech­
niques in ethical practice. 
We begin our discussion with a case. 
Case 1 
Mr. R is an Asian man with seriously compromised lung function, hospitalized 
for several months, currently on a ventilator. The lCU medical team wants to 
remove him from life support, but the family, consisting of his wife and two 
daughters, have so far declined. 
An ethics consult is arranged to mediate between the lCU personnel and the 
family. The family has been in the United States for about six years and the 
wife does not speak English. An interpreter is present. A physician begins by 
asking the wife, through the interpreter, "00 you think your husband would 
want to be like this? Do you think he is happy?" He then shows an X ray of the 
patient's lungs to demonstrate the gravity of his condition. 
A bilingual friend arrives. The physicians present options: Place the patient 
on a ward with a DNR order and the understanding that he will not be moved 
back to the lCU or send him home with a ventilator (although the family has 
already said that everyone works extensive hours and no one will be available 
to stay with him). Because he is not a citizen, there are no nursing homes 
available (in this state) for transferring a ventilator-dependent patient. The 
family friend translates for his wife: "She is his wife, she cannot say whether he 
is happy. As his wife, she does not know what he would want. It is not possible 
for her to decide. Also, she believes that as a Catholic, she cannot choose to 
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withdraw him from life support. She wants him to stay in the lCU on the 
machine."	 . 
At this point in the consult, the medical team is visibly angry, stating 'in 
English that his condition is irreversible and they need his room for someone 
who might live. It's an economic issue. They also comment that the family is 
wrong in their understanding of church policy on withdrawing life support. 
What can ethnographic or cultural analysis add to our understanding of this 
or other such cases? There are a variety of issues in this case that easily lend 
themselves to anthropological exposition. Mutual exploration of the following 
themes by ethicists and anthropologists might generate rich material to shape 
the resolution of this dilemma: 
•	 Patriarchal family and customary gender roles 
•	 Individual versus family (collective) focus of decisions 
•	 Negotiation of religious interpretations 
•	 Discussion of death-how appropriate is open discussion? 
•	 Truth-telling as acceptable or not 
•	 Issues of distributive justice (how do and how should we respond to the 
reality that, if this patient lived in New York or Illinois, he could, as a 
noncitizen, be moved to a nursing home on life support, as his family 
wishes?). 
Our fundamental objective in this discussion is to interrogate the problematic 
biomedical/Euro-American bias toward the individual and overreliance on a 
Euro-American bioethics approach. 
Introduction to the Four Principles Approach 
The Four Principles approach in bioethics, made famous by Beauchamp and 
Childress in the five editions of their classic text on biomedical ethics, is the 
hallmark of the discipline, the theoretical center from which much of the field 
of bioethics has grown.2 Although much critiqued by ethicists from diverse 
standpoints and by anthropologists (e.g., physician-anthropologists Kleinman 
and Helman argue cogently against assuming the relevance of Eurocentric 
premises in clinical practice), these principles continue as implicit, if not 
explicit, premises underlying analysis of ethical issues and decisionmaking in 
clinical settings.3 Indeed, a cursory review of recent scholarship immediately 
illustrates the enduring reliance on Beauchamp and Childress for an ethical 
framework for theory and practice.4 O'Neill, for example, opens a discussion 
on "Practical Principles, Practical Judgment"S by stating that the most well­
known approach to bioethical reasoning that appeals to principles remains that 
of Beauchamp and Childress.6 Similarly, Annas, writing in the New England 
Journal of Medicine, critiques the recent Terri Schiavo case, and emphasizes the 
importance of patients' rights, as consistent with American values and consti­
tutional traditions? He quotes the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court on 
the sanctity of individual choice and self-determination as fundamental con­
stituents of life.8 The principle of individual autonomy as core to ethical 
considerations is again reiterated. 
As an ethical framework, the principles approach is an "attempt[s] to iden­
tify and justify" a given set of moral norms for the "guidance of and evaluation 
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of conduct."9 The principles are described as "four clusters of moral principles" 
and include the following: 
1.	 Respect for autonomy-a norm of respecting the decisionmaking capaci­
ties of individual persons 
2.	 Nonmaleficence-a norm of avoiding the causation of harm 
3.	 Beneficence-a group of norms for not only "doing good" but balancing 
those good works against the risks and costs associated with the effort 
4.	 Justice-a group of norms for distributing benefits, risk, and costs fairly.lO 
Beauchamp and Childress have settled on these principles using assumptions 
about a "common morality" which they define as "[T]he set of norms that all 
morally serious persons share ... [It] contains moral norms that bind all 
persons in all places; no norms are more basic to moral life" 11 and it is "the 
morality that serves as our common heritage." 12 
To utilize these principles in practice, Beauchamp and Childress outline 
several rules. They insist that, "Principles are general norms that leave consid­
erable room for judgment in many cases." More detailed "rules" and "judg­
ments" are therefore required and "function as precise action guides that 
inform us in each circumstance how to act." 13 Some of these rules might 
include the following: 
•	 Substantive Rules (truth-telling, confidentiality, privacy, physician-assisted 
suicide, informed consent, and the like) 
•	 Authority Rules (who may and should perform actions) 
•	 Procedural Rules (rules that establish procedures to be followed, e.g., for 
determining eligibility for scarce resources, for reporting grievances). 
Finally, Beauchamp and Childress introduce elements to contend with nonuni­
versal norms and human idiosyncrasies-these include rights, the idea of 
moral character, virtues, the greatest balances of right and wrong, competing 
obligations, and even emotions. All of these are considered vital to the theory 
and to practical applications, although they are handmaidens to the Four 
Principles. 
In our discussion, we will focus on the culturally Euro-American reification 
of the Individual, which is so fundamental to the four principles as to limit its 
utility for communication in ethical conflicts, even though the U.S. legal system 
rests on the concept of individual rights. The principle of justice affirms the 
isomorphic relationship between a principalist approach and Euro-American 
jurisprudence, yet for patients and families of any cultural or class background, 
the critical meanings associated with an ethical dilemma may be situated 
outside the parameters of this narrow ethical/legal domain. 
What we will propose is simultaneous attention to the individual and cultural 
factors in questions of autonomy, patient rights, and the decisionmaking process. 
Following Marshall and Koenig, we do not "dispute the relevance of abstract 
principles in bioethics ... [but direct our] concern as anthropologists [to] the 
everyday practices derived from these principles, practices that often fall short 
of realizing the normative intent of the principles themselves." 14 In particular, 
we (and they) are troubled by the unexamined "promulgation of a Westernized 
bioethics that fosters only an illusion of global consensus about the morality of 
medical practice." 15 
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As anthropologists, we suggest that the subject of medical ethics should be 
the cultural construction of morality, particularly morality surrounding health 
and disease. Empiricism is requisite for a just and informed bioethics-a 
descriptive bioethics that grounds each case in its cultural, historical, and 
political-economic contexts. There are two main critiques we make: that the 
individual is so prioritized and central as to become an unquestioned presump­
tion of care and that the notion of a common morality is a false, if not a 
culturally imperialist, idea that justifies the devaluation of locally meaningful 
moralities. Were one to explore it at a sufficiently high level of abstraction, one 
might be able to identify areas of widely shared values. However, when one 
gets to the specifics of when certain moral values can be imposed, then what 
seem in the abstract to be morally universals quickly become culturally specific. 
For example, when is it acceptable to kill? Is it ever acceptable to rape? What 
constitutes child abuse? 16 
Reification of the Individual 
The reification of individual choice in the principalist approach is evident in 
several places: 
•	 in notions of the autonomy of any given individual 
•	 in the complete preoccupation with a focal "patient," the single suffering 
individual 
•	 and even in biomedically defined "cases" (which have a hegemonically 
determined beginning and end). 
These assumptions, long the target of critique by medical anthropologists as 
well as by some medical ethicists, reinforce specific cultural notions about the 
target of care, the definition of the patient, and the responsibilities of various 
parties involved. These assumptions are increasingly inappropriate in health­
care, where patients frequently come from cultural backgrounds different from 
their doctors. Helman, a physician and anthropologist, notes that biomedicine 
focuses on the individual patient, or even the individual organ, while ignoring 
wider familial, social, and economic issues that render consensus or problem 
resolution difficult to achieve. 17 
Anthropologist Patricia Marshall has suggested that, "Bioethics practices that 
celebrate only autonomy, with its emphasis on choice, and downplay social and 
economic constraints on individual agency, are out of touch with health-care 
realities in the U.S., as well as globally. The changed discourse-doctor be­
comes provider and patient becomes consumer-reflects fundamental, systemic 
problems characteristic of market-driven medicine." 18 Marshall and Koenig 
argue that conventional individual-focused bioethics practices by themselves, 
and without attention to the broader context in which individual decisions are 
made, may be inadequate. 
Beauchamp and Childress respond to attacks leveled against the Autonomy 
Principle by insisting on the individual right to determine the form and content 
of care. They write: 
We defend a principle of respect for autonomy with a correlative right 
to choose (not a mandatory duty to choose). (A study they describe of 
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800 subjects from 4 different ethnic groups-Korean American, Mexi­
can American, European American, and African American-showed 
ethnicity to be a primary correlate with attitudes toward disclosure 
and decision-making. But, they go on) ... [e]ven if the patient del­
egates [their decisionmaking] right to someone else, the choice to 
delegate is itself autonomous.19 
Patients whose cultural or family context renders them unable or unwilling to 
make decisions about their own care can, according to the principle of auton­
omy, choose to refuse information about their health and direct that others will 
make decisions for them. How and by whom these interactions will occur is left 
to guesswork. AB Beauchamp and Childress respond, the only obligation is on 
the physician. 
There is a fundamental obligation to ensure that patients have the 
right to choose, as well as the right to accept or to decline informa­
tion.... The tricky practical question is whether it is possible to 
inform patients of their rights to know and to decide without compro­
mising their systems of belief and value or otherwise disrespecting 
them.20 
A "tricky practical question" indeed. Patient decisionmaking has become an 
obligation in the lived world of hospital and managed care and we suggest that 
a truly moral stance cannot ignore the context within which ethical theories are 
played out and must acknowledge the reality in which its ideals must be 
rooted. 
That is, to propose as a theoretical principle a concept (Le., non-obligatory 
autonomy) that is almost universally disregarded must call into question the 
validity of the theory. If patient autonomy is viewed in the vast majority of 
settings as not just a right but an obligation of patients, then this problem 
demands both theoretical and pragmatic remedies. The Four Principles ap­
proach offers neither. 
AB we have noted, Beauchamp and Childress do claim sensitivity to the social 
determinants of morality and to the function of judgment applied in individual 
cases. They say that the four principles are general norms that leave "consid­
erable room for judgment in many cases." In addition, they acknowledge that 
moral virtues, paramount in driving decisions for each clinical case, are socially 
determined. Yet, they say, we do not approach those cases tabula rasa but with 
norms and assumptions informed by culture, history, and the like. 
We suggest that proponents of the principles framework approach their cases 
and theory with the same culturally informed assumptions. They have built a 
theory that so reifies the individual that no room is left available in cases for 
judgments that might contradict these fundamental assumptions. 
Common Morality 
The idea of a common, universal morality is not something readily accepted by 
anthropologists, and it has come under considerable attack by bioethicists as 
well. Beauchamp and Childress acknowledge this when they write: 
the common morality's norms do require interpretation if we are to 
have workable practical ethics. Such interpretation is often subject to 
vigorous dispute in order to resolve particular problems.21 
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They acknowledge that not all people accept these norms, but that all serious 
people accept them, presumably serious Euro-Americans. 
Recent conversations have attempted to align the "common morality" with 
notions of basic human rights. Thus, there are basic human rights (roughly 
equivalent to the notion of a common morality) and there is community­
specific morality, which takes into account local variation in what is considered 
appropriate moral behavior and motivation. This distinction is far too general 
to guide clinical practice. 
So, to employ the Four Principles approach, we must accept that humans 
share innate (i.e., universal) processes or characteristics that eventuate in a 
common morality. Anthropologists, trained to be sensitive to the diversity of 
human thoughts and values, typically eschew such assumptions about innate 
or universal. Virtually all schools of anthropology entail an acceptance of at 
least a weak form of descriptive relativism. Normative relativism, favored by 
some anthropologists, goes a step further in asserting that, because cultures 
judge each other according to their own internal standards, there are no 
universal standards to judge between cultures.22 
Some of the assumptions made under the banner of common morality 
include: individualistic thinking-rather than communal, family, or some other 
form of thought or orientation; the linearity of time-rather than cyclical time; 
the universality of truth-telling; informed consent; definitions of personhood; 
ownership and transplantation of body parts; and withholding or withdrawing 
life-sustaining treatments as moral virtues.23 
Ethnographies (i.e., anthropological descriptions and analyses of specific 
cultures) abound that challenge the appropriateness of these "beliefs." These 
assumptions become very apparent and, often, problematic in end-of-life care. 
Barbara Koenig, for example, says that advance directive assume an ideal 
patient with 
•	 a clear understanding of the illness, prognosis, and treatment options 
shared with the medical team 
•	 a temporal orientation to the future and a desire to maintain control over 
the future 
•	 a perception of freedom of choice 
•	 a willingness to discuss death openly.24 
This largely represents educated, middle/upper-middle class Americans. But 
Smith-Morris's research among elderly, predominantly Anglo adults in Arizona 
suggests that even these privileged citizens are ill prepared for a more likely 
end-of-life scenario.25 
Alternatives and What Anthropology/ists Can Offer 
What principles or ethical theory could better address this plurality? A vari­
ety of alternative theories and approaches exist now for bioethicists to choose 
from, for example, casuistry, relationship-based approaches, utilitarianism, 
character or virtue ethics, and communitarianism. But few of these provide 
for the type and depth of descriptive context we propose, and none address 
authoritative knowledge and the power structures within which decisions 
about health and healthcare are made. So if none of these options do it, what 
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exactly can anthropologists add? Why would ethnographic data lead to more 
ethical practice? 
Case 2 
To explore anthropologists' potential roles in improving bioethics, we offer a 
brief second case. 
A young adult male is brought to the ER having swallowed a Pentium 4 
computer chip. He has a history of psychotic episodes. He now has bowel 
obstruction but refuses surgery, apparently wanting to keep the mechanism. A 
psychiatry consult determines that he is not competent to make decisions and 
he is sent to surgery. 
Once there, an OR authority questions him to determine if he is "oriented X 3." 
He knows his name, the day, and the president. The OR nurse then over­
rides the surgery decision, having determined to her own satisfaction that he 
is competent. 
In an ethics consult to discuss the decisionmaking process in this case, the 
psychiatry residents mention that although the patient is mildly retarded, this 
was not a factor in their determination that he lacked the capacity to make a 
decision about surgery. The OR nurse then vigorously states that if she had 
known he was retarded, she would have never questioned the psychiatry 
decision. 
So this case raises questions concerning cultural constructs of mental illness 
and mental functioning that affect both popular thinking and understandings 
of biomedical professionals outside psychiatry. It appears from the discussion 
that the concept of "retardation" is less contested than that of psychosis, or 
delusional states, even within biomedicine. 
An ethnography of nurses and doctors in different specialties and their 
understandings of psychosis might provide us with information that could 
then remedy some of these issues, thus leading to workshops on what it means 
to be delusional, especially in relation to functioning effectively in some 
domains of social life. This, in turn, could enhance the understanding of how 
decisionmaking competence is determined and the limits of individual auton­
omy. That is, anthropologists can add ethnographic detail, informing ethicists 
and clinicians of the personal narratives, cultural meanings, and local morali­
ties that shape decisionmaking. We should note that the concept of "personal 
narrative" might suggest an idiosyncratic, subjective account. However, as 
Kaufman cogently argues, narratives are constructed from shared understand­
ings of the cultural world, and as such, they identify important cultural and 
structural features that shape individual moral thought and feeling.26 
Authoritative Knowledge 
A theory of biomedical ethics must step beyond the bounds of hegemonic 
assumptions. The principalist approach re-creates and reinforces the primacy of 
individualism, rationality, and a bounded temporal experience of disease while 
failing to acknowledge power relations implicit in biomedical decisionmaking. 
Authoritative knowledge is produced, displayed, resisted, and challenged in 
social, clinical, and political interactions. Much research, including Sargent's, 
demonstrates the links between control of technology and the hierarchy of 
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relations between specialists and patientsP But research also shows the possi­
bility for interactional cooperation (alliances) and accommodation in the clini­
cal setting. The constitution of authoritative knowledge is an ongoing social 
process; it constructs and reflects power relationships within a community of 
practice. The process by which this occurs is such that all participants tend to 
see the current social order as "the way things obviously are." 
These hegemonic forces are what Beauchamp and Childress seem most blind 
to. Questions of power in moral and ethical dilemmas-power between prac­
titioners and patients, power between different types or fields of practitioners, 
power within families and cultures-are marginalized and left unchallenged. 
Many bioethicists and clinicians might argue that they have moved beyond a 
rigid application of principles to resolve ethical dilemmas, and rather, engage 
in flexible negotiations, indeed in a form of therapeutic intervention in the 
resolution of such conflicts. We need to ask, however, what is the ultimate 
objective of these negotiations? Often, the implicit, if not explicit, goal is to 
convey to the patient and/or family the preferred decision of the clinician, 
based presumably on medical expertise or institutional concerns about liability. 
Should we consider these "flexible negotiations" a form of benevolent pater­
nalism? We suggest the importance of acknowledging the authoritative knowl­
edge of the physician and other biomedical practitioners. Physicians, whose 
moral weight and perceived scientific expertise are linked to formidable med­
ical technologies, are in a position of power, and rarely in an egalitarian, 
collaborative interaction.28 How authoritative knowledge is produced and 
displayed in ethical consultations is a question that anthropologists could 
usefully address. 
A grounded approach to bioethics can be generated by ethnography. Under­
standing the patient's explanatory model can help bioethicists as well as 
biomedical practitioners explain that system to patients/families so that they 
can make better informed decisions that the system, in fact, requires them to 
make. For example, the value placed on the individual in the United States 
creates not an accidental correspondence between the ethics approach and the 
legal protocol; the predominant ethics approach is isomorphic with the legal 
system (J. Sadler, personal communication). 
Do ethics consults actually do broader cultural work of furthering a shared 
moral order in the context of a multicultural society? If we inform only the 
system of the patient's model, we are reinforcing medicine as a privileged 
domain of moral discourse. However, if we inform patients of cultural details, 
power dynamics, and institutional requirements of biomedicine, then they can 
ask more nuanced questions and have a better chance of truly participating in 
an asymmetric therapeutic interaction. 
We propose an alternative for moving between a larger cultural, historical, or 
family structure and context to the notion of an individual as the unit of 
analysis. We would first redefine "the case." 
The boundedness of the case is another unexamined assumption fundamen­
tal in the principalist approach and closely related to, if not produced by, the 
reification of individuals. Helman, for instance, observes that biomedicine is 
unique in its imposition on the patient of a linear narrative structure, the "case 
history." 29 
The clinical case-the identified patient, other relevant decisionmakers, even 
the parameters in a temporal sense (when illness began and when it ends)-is 
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a manufactured product; a certain telling of the story among many other 
possible tellings.30 Relegated to the background are the economic and social 
contexts of the patient's life, cultural factors in the recognition and meaning of 
illness, potential stigma, simultaneous (other) healing efforts, and so forth. 
Even casuist and hermeneutic approaches, known for their strident rejection of 
principalism, fail to expand the parameters of the case itself. 
A procedurally simple change, implemented not after or in the midst of a crisis 
(as we so often see in ethics consults), but at the initial presentation for care­
that is, as part of the intake process-would allow the alignment of patient and 
clinician expectations to occur at a more natural point in the relationship. This 
approach would involve eliciting the patient and family's explanatory model. 
An explanatory model, as first proposed by Arthur Kleinman and later elabo­
rated by him with Leon Eisenberg and Byron Good, are the notions about an 
episode of sickness and its treatment that are employed by all those engaged in 
the clinical process. Barry Hoffmaster adds that patient models reflect social 
class, cultural beliefs, education, occupation, religious affiliation, and past 
experience with illness and healthcare.31 Returning to the issue of power 
differentials, Helman argues that the power invested in clinicians as a result of 
their training and technical expertise often allows them to shape the patient's 
explanatory model to fit the medical model, rather than allowing the patient's 
perspective on illness to emerge.32 Correspondingly, Kleinman, in his ground­
breaking book on medicine as a cultural system, states that 
the most difficult aspect of clinical practice to teach to medical stu­
dents, interns, and residents is how to elicit and evaluate objectively 
patient beliefs and values with respect to their illnesses and treatments 
and to negotiate with (or translate between) these differing perspec­
tives, in the same wayan advisor gives expert advice to an advisee, 
who retains the right to accept, alter, or reject that advice.33 
Collecting the explanatory model can be done through a series of questions like 
those in Figure 1. 
Adapting this model for a more ethically neutral approach to healthcare 
decisionmaking might look like the model shown in Figure 2. That is, it would 
begin with aspects of decisionmaking and the values and beliefs guiding care. 
Descriptive Level:
 




What does the illness do to you? How does it work?
 
Why do you think it started when it did?
 










Why did you (in particular) get sick?
 
Figure 1. An explanatory model. 
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Descriptive Level:
 
Who else, ifanyone, has been or shouJd be involved in your care?
 
Conceptual Level: 
In cases like yours, what family or friends usually are involved in 
decisions? 
How are decisions about health care made in your 
family/cuJture/neighborhood? 
What do you feel doctorslhospitaJs shouJd provide in these cases? 
(What are your expectations?) 
Institutional Protocol (Physician) 
Explanation of U.S. biomedicaJ conventions, state laws, ''how the 
system works," as appropriate 
Advance directives, Futility concept 
Appropriate vocabuJary for cuJture, social class 
Figure 2. An ethically neutral model. 
How might ethical decisions change if cases came to be viewed as life stories, 
family events, or other ongoing narrative? A grounded approach that is in­
formed by ethnographic information would reliably attend to the structural, 
institutional, and procedural barriers that worsen-and in many cases produce­
ethical dilemmas in care. Armed with this information, clinicians and institu­
tions would at least have insight into problematic arenas requiring changes. 
A final case will demonstrate what we suggest. 
Case 3 
A doctor writes to an ethics committee requesting a discussion of patients who 
behave abusively to doctors and nurses. The committee, composed of doctors, 
nurses, social workers, chaplains, and community representatives, agrees that 
this is an important issue. The anthropologist present asks what is this abuse 
(verbal and sometimes physical) and who are the abusers? The response from 
one prominent and respected physician is "generic scumbags." The anthropol­
ogist suggests a survey in which when a case arises, the following information 
is reported to a central source: age, sex, ethnicity of patient, medical condition, 
and circumstances/context when incident occurred. Committee members are 
not interested, deciding rather to ask for a consult with psychiatry on how to 
manage disruptive patients. For them, a key ethical issue is whether it is 
acceptable to call security for such a patient (with exceptions made for some­
one with dementia or on drugs). 
Management of the abusive patients, certainly a reasonable concern, becomes 
the core issue of discussion. What we lack, however, are any data on precisely 
who these "abusers" might be (we might speculate on age, sex, insurance 
status) and in what sorts of situations abusive behavior might emerge. Eliciting 
and analyzing this information might then provide us with a means to address 
the fundamental, underlying causes of disruptive behavior, and therefore to 
identify possible structural factors implicated in these scenarios. 
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Closing 
Bioethics is a field now dominated by premises of Western philosophical 
thought: principles and rights-based approaches that have reinforced a uper­
vasive reductionism, utilitarianism, and ethnocentrism in the field. u34 The 
original bioethics was intended to empower patients in the context of a 
rights-based approach, which would allow patients to reclaim power from 
biomedical expertise. It is ironic that this effort to generate empowerment has 
had such mixed results.35 
We suggest that incorporating an ethnographic approach in ethical analysis 
would challenge ethicists to pay greater attention to how moral concepts are 
embedded in social practice and how biomedical practitioners and institutional 
patterns shape the production and experience of ethical dilemmas.36 
Value neutrality is untenable in a Ureal~worldU bioethics. But anthropologists 
can effect change both directly (in communication with patients and practition­
ers) and by advocating for structural change that might have broader impacts: 
for example, decentralization of primary care services might allow patients to 
develop therapeutic relationships and alliances that would limit disruptive 
behavior; intake and consent-gathering procedures that incorporate a larger 
network of those invested might forestall later crises and disputes. 
What we need are theories of bioethics that do not reproduce, in an unexam­
ined way, the assumptions of a single cultural paradigm; we would benefit 
from forms of pedagogy that integrate anthropological and other social science 
perspectives-and the incorporation of ethnographic techniques in ethical 
practice-to situate problems in biomedical, familial, interpersonal contexts. 
There are no simple and formulaic models that can address diverse cultural 
differences. We are suggesting the need for further cross-disciplinary talk about 
uhow to talk,u with the ultimate objective of generating informed and collab­
orative negotiation of critical life issues. 
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